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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
the record itself." (Emphasis by the court.) Under the construction
adopted in that case, the writ would be quashed only if the defect
appeared on the face of the writ and the defect was so substantial
as to render the writ void. The Hall case was cited in the principal
case but was not distinguished, so that now, apparently, the rule
has been changed.
Assuming that the motion to quash should have been sustained
but was overruled, with an exception duly saved, did D waive his
objection by proceeding to trial upon the merits? This question
was answered in the negative in the principal case, although it has
not always been so answered in this state. See Carlin, A Decade of
Pleading, Practice and Procedure, 53 W. VA L. Rlv. 1 (1950). In
fact, in the recent case of Stone v. Rudolph, 127 W. Va. 335, 340,
32 S.E.2d 742, 745 (1944), not alluded to in the principal case, the
court observed that ". . . whatever the rule may have been at one
time, we think it clear that, as the law now is, a general appearance
after a plea or motion attacking the form of, or the return of service
of process waives any defect in the process or the service thereof, on
the general theory that the office of a process is to bring a defendant
into court and give him notice of the proceeding; and while he
may appear specially to attack the form of return of service thereof,
he cannot afterwards appear generally for any purpose without a
waiver of his objections thereto."
There is little quarrel with the application of the rules
enunciated in the principal case but there are serious doubts con-
cerning the advisability of the changes in interpretation which are
effected by this decision. Since procedural rules are only a means
to an end, it is especially important that their construction not be
changed in the absence of a pressing need therefor.
G. M. S.
VENuE-NONRESIDENT MOTORIST STATUTE.-P brought an action
based on an alleged collision between P's motor vehicle and a
motor vehicle owned by D foreign corporation and driven by non-
resident D as an employee of D corporation. Held, that the venue
of the action was in the county in which the collision occurred, and
that the statute, providing that operation by nonresidents of motor
vehicles upon public roads of this state is equivalent to appoint-
ment of the state auditor to be the nonresident's attorney upon
whom process may be served in an action against the nonresident
growing out of an accident or collision in the state, did not author-
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ize maintenance of such action in the county in which P resided.
Crawford v. Carson, 78 S.E.2d 268 (W. Va. 1953).
Syllabus 1 of the case states that this statute, W. VA. CODE c. 56,
art. 3, § 31 (Michie, 1949), providing for appointment of the
state auditor as a nonresident's attorney, relates only to service of
process on persons coming within its provisions and does not modify
or extend statutes or common law principles concerning venue.
The Maryland court, under a similar statute, determined the
venue of the action under common law principles, and held that,
the action being a transitory one at common law, the action might
be brought in any county in the state. Alcaresse v. Stinger, 197
Md. 236, 78 A.2d 651 (1951). However, there have been such
extensive changes in the statutes of this state relating to venue that
the common law principles have been superseded. Crawford v.
Carson, supra. The statutes relating to corporations are exclusive.
L. Sonneborn Sons v. Ansonia Copper & Iron Works, 121 W. Va.
736, 6 S.E.2d 249 (1940). Venue must therefore be determined
according to the applicable statutes, and not under the common
law.
The principal case was decided under W. VA. CODE c. 56, art. 1,
§ 2 (Michie, 1949), which reads, "An action, suit or proceeding
may be brought in any county where the cause of action, or any
part thereof, arose, although none of the defendants reside therein,
in the following instances: (a) When the defendant, or if more
than one defendant, one or more of the defendants, is a corpora-
tion .. " This is the applicable statute relating to a foreign cor-
poration, unless the corporation is within W. VA. CODE c. 56, art. 1,
§ 1(b) (Michie, 1949).
If none of the defendants are corporations, this part of the
statute would not apply, and the action could not be maintained
in the county where the accident occurred, unless it came within
W. VA. CODE C. 56, art. 1, § 2 (b) (Michie, 1949), "where the de-
fendant, or if more than one defendant, one or more of the de-
fendants, are served in such county with process or notice com-
mencing such action, suit or proceeding." The general venue
statute, W. VA. CODE C. 56, art. 1, § 1 (Michie, 1949) reads, "Any
action or other proceeding at law or suit in equity, except where it
is otherwise specially provided, may hereafter be brought in the
circuit court of any county: . . . (d) If it be against one or more
nonresidents of the State, wherein any one of them may be found
and served with process. . . ." The problem presented by these
sections of the code relates to the question where the defendant is
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found and served, when process is served on the state auditor.
Two views are taken of this problem:
1. One view is that the state officer is the agent of the non-
resident in any county of the state in which the action is otherwise
properly brought. Carter v. Schackne, 173 Tenn. 44, 114 S.W.2d
787 (1938); Bessan v. Public Service Co-Ordination Transport, 135
N.Y. Misc. 368, 237 N.Y. Supp. 689 (1929).
2. The other view is that, the effect of the statute being that
the state officer automatically becomes the agent of the defendant,
the defendant is found, through this agent, in the county where
the agent resides. It was held in Bouchillon v. Jordan, 40 F. Supp.
354 (E.D. Miss. 1941), that the county where the accident occurred
did not and could not acquire jurisdiction of the defendant under
statutes similar to ours; but suit should have been filed in the
county wherein the state officer was a resident. One court permits
this action to be brought either in the parish where the state officer
performs his duties as statutory agent for service of process, or in
the parish where the injury occurred. Dergstedt v. Neff, 17 F. Supp.
753 (D.C. La. 1937).
The court in the principal case rejected the first view and
stated that the official residence of the auditor did not exist in
every county in the state by reason of the fact that he had state-
wide authority. The court refused to depart from the rule
enounced in earlier West Virginia cases. Rorer v. People's B., L.
8c S. Ass'n, 47 W. Va. 1, 34 S.E. 758 (1899); Sovereign Coal Co. v.
Britton, 77 W. Va. 566, 87 S.E. 925 (1916); Sonneborn Sons v.
Ansonia Copper & Iron Works, supra.
A. J. B.
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